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Jorge Luis Borges and the Nothingness 





In his preface to the Labyrinths collection of the writings of Jorge Luis 
Borges, Andre Maurois observes that “the deep confrontation of literature 
and life… is not only the central problem of all literature but also that of all 
human experience: the problem of illusion and reality.”1 One of the biggest 
illusions we have to contend with is our sense of self. A number of thinkers 
down the ages - from the Buddha to today’s philosophers and scientists – 
appear to support this notion that the self is illusory. We seem, 
nevertheless, to need the self – illusion or not – to help us comprehend 
reality, to provide us with a consistent narrative about ourselves and the 
world. In the midst of creating and maintaining a self, we as individuals 
aim moreover to project a certain image of our self, and this gives rise to a 
psychological feedback loop. To present a particular view of the self we 
behave in a specific manner and play certain roles in an attempt to 
influence how others think of us as a person. But our interaction with others 
too influences in turn how our self takes shape. The American sociologist, 
Robert Ezra Park, notes that “the word person, in its first meaning, is a 
mask,” and thought this is “no mere historical accident… it is rather a 
recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or 
less consciously, playing a role.”2 
In this article, I aim to show how Borges uses his cognizance of 
these thoughts on selfhood to explore the “central problem of literature” 
that Maurois highlights and how in the process projects to the reader his 
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idea of reality. I argue also that the self that Borges tries to present in his 
work may nevertheless not be always congruent with the self he may have 
wanted to convey. This is because his quest is influenced by a number of 
factors, not least the fact that the self-creation process is affected by our 
interplay with the external world. 
This article begins with, in the first two sections, a rather high-level 
overview of the thoughts of philosophers, scientists and sociologists about 
the nature of the self. A short synopsis of the concepts of selfhood that 
seem common to the views of these thinkers is then offered in the next 
section. The subsequent sections expand on these concepts in the context of 
Borges’ oeuvre to explain how he uses his knowledge of these ideas in 
presenting his view of reality. In the last section I aim to examine how the 
gap between language and reality – another limitation of the self-machinery 
– is reflected in Borges’ work. 
 
The self: what do philosophers and scientists think? 
Perhaps one of the earliest thinkers to examine the nature of the self was 
Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, who lived around the fifth century BCE. 
According to the Buddha’s ‘no self’ (anatta in Pali) view, a person consists 
of a body and four attributes corresponding to different cognitive functions. 
Buddhism does not however consider the self as bringing together these 
psychological elements. Nor does Buddhism identify the self with any one 
of these characteristics. This is because, as the Oxford philosopher and 
orientalist, Jan Westerhoff, clarifies, these attributes are always in a state of 
flux whereas we look upon the self as being unchanging and continuous. 
Westerhoff points out that this does not imply however that talk of the self 
or persons having a separate identity is meaningless. Having a concept of 
the self does have its use: it allows us “conceptualize… [and] locate 
ourselves in the world.”3 Westerhoff compares the self to the mouse which 
allows us to locate ourselves on the computer screen. The self, it would 
therefore seem, is merely superimposed on our body and cognitive 
constituents purely as a practical necessity and, as the Buddha viewed it, 
“has nothing more than a strictly nominal existence.”4 
Experimental psychologist, Bruce Hood, reflects the Buddha’s 
denial of a separate identity of the self when noting that “we should be 
                                                
3 Jan Westerhoff, Reality: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 70. 
4 Westerhoff, Reality, p. 70. 
Borges and Nothingness 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 107 
sceptical that each of us is the coherent, integrated entity we assume we 
are.”5 Hood compares the self-illusion to an illusory figure such as a 
Kanizsa pattern that evokes an object whose edges are generated purely by 
the surrounding context. We may realise it is a trick of the mind but, as 
Hood points out, we may not realise that it is our brain which is “actually 
generating the neural activation as if the illusory shape was really there.” 
Such an argument could, some would claim, be offered also in respect of all 
perceptual activity. But the difference here, Hood clarifies, is that 
perception is based on real objects combined with physical irregularities. 
But what makes experiencing the self different is that it “does not exist 
independently of my brain alone that is having the experience.”6 
Hood concurs with the notion that the self is nonetheless a practical 
necessity by viewing “the self illusion [as] an inescapable experience we 
need for interacting with others and the world, and [therefore] we cannot… 
abandon or ignore its influence.” Similar ideas, Hood points out, are to be 
found also in the writings of both David Hume and Baruch Spinoza. 
Perhaps more significantly, he adds that now “good psychological and 
physiological evidence” is becoming available as empirical support for 
these ideas.7 
Neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran also points out that more 
scientific evidence can be offered to support the contention of philosophers 
and other thinkers that the self is illusory. “After extensive training in 
Western medicine and more than fifteen years of research on neurological 
patients and visual illusions,” he has “come to realise that there is much 
truth to this view.”8 Ramachandran thinks the reason why the idea of a 
single ‘I’ or ‘self’ residing in our brains could be an illusion is that there 
may in fact be a “host of unconscious zombies who exist in peaceful 
harmony along with the ‘person’ inside your body!”9 Ramachandran too 
agrees nevertheless with the view that a sense of self is needed to better 
organize our lives.10 
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The philosopher Daniel Dennett offers the analogy of paper money 
to explain the usefulness of the self. The paper on which the money is 
printed does not have any inherent value. It derives value from the concepts 
or social conventions – as a tool for exchange of assets, for instance – 
associated with it. But, whatever their shortcomings, the use of recognised 
currencies makes economies work smoothly and efficiently. 11  Oxford 
philosopher, Derek Parfit, while considering the self illusion links the 
Buddhist view of the self having only a ‘nominal existence’ (similar to 
paper money) to his exposition of the ‘Bundle Theory’ about what 
constitutes a person. The Bundle Theory firstly explains the unity of 
consciousness (which underlies our sense of self) as a series of related 
events or moments. Each series is held together by a set of causal relations 
akin to a bundle tied together with a string. And, each series of these 
thoughts and sensations equate to what we call one life. Secondly, there are 
no such things as a person who is “believed to be more than this… [who] is 
distinct from brains and bodies, and the various kinds of mental states and 
events.”12 Parfit considers the Buddha as the first proponent of the Bundle 
Theory of the self. Parfit argues that when Buddhists concede that persons 
have nominal existence, they imply that “persons are merely combinations 
of other elements.”13 Only what can exist on its own as a separate being has 
what Buddhism calls ‘actual existence’. Thanks however to the apparent 
persistence of this notion of a self, some may still argue that we are more 
than our cognitive functions and psychological events and that we do 
possess ‘actual existence’. The Bundle Theory concedes this position but 
claims we are constrained to hold on to that fallacious idea because we are 
unable to break the confines of our grammar and language when thinking 
of the self.14 
Scottish philosopher David Hume also thought that our selves may 
not have existence apart from our mental events. “For my part, when I enter 
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other… I never can catch myself at any time without a 
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perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.”15 Hume 
was aware too that although these perceptions are so momentary and 
observed (with echoes of the Bundle Theory of identity) “I am a bundle of 
different perceptions… [I still have] some idea of personal identity, and 
that must be accounted for.”16 Hume offers an explanation of how this idea 
arises by stating that it happens “because of the… resemblance or causal 
connection within the chain of my perception… and memory extends this 
idea past my immediate perceptions.”17 
The causal connections between perceptions that Hume talked 
about, together with memory, exhibit a concord that is characteristic of a 
seemingly unified consciousness. As Ramachandran points out, “the most 
obvious fact of existence is your sense of being a single, unified self ‘in 
charge’ of your destiny.”18 This apparent unity is a feature of the account of 
a single continuing self that we spin to ourselves. These stories “issue forth, 
[moreover] as if from a single source,” Daniel Dennett points out, “[and] 
their effect on any audience is to… posit a unified agent whose words they 
are, about whom they are…”19 
Both philosophers and neuroscientists have wondered about what 
makes up this unity of consciousness and have noted that we experience it 
both at a particular point in time and over time. The first kind of 
experience, called synchronic unity, refers to how we experience different 
perceptions simultaneously. The other kind of experience, diachronic unity, 
is that of a unified consciousness over time.20 Both these categories of 
experience seem to relate to how we maintain our identity as a person: 
firstly, a unified ‘I’ appears to be aware of a synchronic unity when we 
experience a number of different perceptions at the same single point in 
time. (I am listening to music while reading the paper and I can also hear 
traffic noise in the background.) We also preserve, alongside this, a sense 
of unity over time. (I could assert, for example: “I have been married to the 
same person for twenty years.”) Dennett thinks that the self illusion 
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19 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 418. 
20  Andrew Brook and Paul Raymont, ‘The Unity of Consciousness’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, at http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=consciousness-unity. 
Accessed 19/7/2016. 
Borges and Nothingness 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 110 
provides a “center of narrative gravity” which despite being “yet another 
abstraction… [functions] as the ‘owner of record’ of whatever items and 
features [including our experiences in time and over time that] are lying 
about unclaimed.”21 
The fact that this unity of consciousness – especially across time – 
is fundamental for all cognitive abilities has been noted by many different 
thinkers over a long period of time. Immanuel Kant, for instance, thought 
that diachronic unity is a requirement for even such a rudimentary 
operation as counting mentally.22 In recent times, Thomas Metzinger, the 
German philosopher, has argued that the self – as a vehicle for preserving 
this unity – has by being “a very, very specific kind of representational 
structure… proved to be adaptive, biologically successful.” 23 
Ramachandran affirms this view when he observes that “the self may 
indeed be a useful biological construct based on specific brain mechanisms 
– a set of organizing principles that allows us to function more 
efficiently…” He indicates additionally that many authors (including the 
late physician and neurologist Oliver Sacks) have greatly admired the 
“remarkable endurance of the self… amid the vicissitudes of life.”24 
 
The self: what do the sociologists think? 
The Canadian-American sociologist, Erving Goffman, appears to concur 
with the thinkers we reviewed above on their notion of the self as illusory. 
Goffman expressed the view that the self “is not an organic thing that has a 
specific location,” in his book The Presentation of the Self in Everyday 
Life.25 While taking a dramaturgical perspective in this book, Goffman 
expresses the view that when we participate in social interactions (or 
“performances” as Goffman calls them) we reveal “the very structure of the 
self.” A self does not spring from the person but rather “from the whole 
scene of action… A correctly staged and performed scene leads the 
audience to impute a self to a performed character…”26 In his analysis, 
Goffman lays more emphasis thus on the influence of the external world in 
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shaping the self, rather than those factors – such as values and beliefs – that 
may be considered endemic to the person. The person, Goffman observes, 
“and his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative 
manufacture will be hung…”27 The reason why social interaction is such a 
significant factor in shaping the self is this: every time we interact with 
someone both participants are trying to derive the highest benefit from the 
encounter and attempting to impose (as Michael Dirda explains in a review 
of Goffman’s body of work) “their claim to what reality is.”28 
In laying importance on the role of society in the construction of 
the self, Goffman’s views are similar to that of George Herbert Mead, the 
American social theorist. Mead believed that the self begins to develop 
when a person plays a role in a social environment. Mead considered 
‘roles’ (as Mitchell Aboulafia, a professor of philosophy at Manhattan 
College, elucidates) as an individual’s actions and responses to that of 
others in the social group. Mead held however that merely emulating others 
and their mannerism has little effect on the self-making process. He 
therefore felt that the development of the self needs to be more ‘cognitive’. 
To explain this, Mead introduced the neologism the generalized other 
which he defines as “the organized community or social group which gives 
to the individual his unity of self.”29 This unity of self is realised when the 
individual views a given social activity from the perspective of all the 
members of the social group and identifies the behaviour considered 
appropriate in different social settings. 30  A certain similarity can be 
perceived between Mead’s ‘generalized other’ and Goffman’s use of the 
term ‘audience’ – one of the many theatrical metaphors that the latter uses 
in his exploration of the self – as they both stress the importance of the 
social group with which an individual interacts. 
While both Mead and Goffman talk about how the social group 
influences the self-making undertaking, Goffman does not completely 
discount the fact that the individual too tries to impose his or her view of 
reality. He distinguishes furthermore between the two parts of a person that 
are revealed in a social situation: the individual is first viewed as a 
                                                
27 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, p. 245. 
28  Michael Dirda, ‘Waiting for Goffman’, Lapham’s Quarterly, at 
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“performer… a harried fabrication of impressions involved in the all-too-
human task of staging a performance.”31 But the individual tries also to 
evoke a “character” which is “some kind of image, usually creditable, 
which the individual… attempts to induce others to hold in regard to 
him.”32 
Goffman uses the term “impression management” to refer to how 
the “individual knowingly or unknowingly projects a definition of the 
situation, of which a concept of himself is an important part.” 33  A 
significant component of this concept is the desire to project the impression 
to the external world that they, the individual, “are living up to the many 
standards by which they… are judged.”34 Consequently, the individual 
“implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is 
fostered before them.”35 But, as much as the individual tries to influence the 
perception of his audience – and is the one who will gain or lose from the 
performance – “the self itself does not derive from its possessor,” Goffman 
maintains, “[but is] a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is 
presented…”36 
When we perform and play roles, there can be no assurance that the 
process will either be easy or be devoid of mishaps. As Goffman observes, 
“the whole machinery of self-production is cumbersome.”37 This is because 
an actor can lose control over how much he or she wishes to reveal to the 
audience, and what and how much to hide, by (inadvertently or not) 
neglecting to respect the boundaries of what Goffman refers to as the 
“social establishment”. Erving Goffman employs this term to denote “any 
place surrounded by fixed barriers to perception in which a particular kind 
of activity regularly takes place.”38 These boundaries also represent those 
separating the ‘front’ from ‘backstage’. By ‘front’ Goffman means “that 
part of the individual’s performance which [defines] the situation for [the 
audience].” Front is denoted by “the expressive equipment of a standard 
kind… employed by the individual during his performance.”39 Backstage, 
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38 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, p. 231. 
39 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, p. 32. 
Borges and Nothingness 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 113 
on the other hand, is where the actor can unwind and can serve as “a place 
of escape and refuge,” as Dirda notes, “[and is] essential to our lives.”40 It 
is where the actors can use unseemly language, openly criticise each other’s 
performances and transgress other social niceties. When applied to a social 
setting, these faux pas occur when people – as Goffman observed in his 
essay on “Role Distance” – “wear… inappropriate clothes… arrive… late 
for an appointment, become a trifle overheated in argument…”41 The 
smooth flow of the performance – and the impression that the actor wants 
to create on the audience – is disrupted however when the actor fails to be 
conscious of these dividing lines. 
It is apparent from this account that certain common ideas about 
the self underscore the thoughts of the philosophers, scientists and 
sociologists we have reviewed so far. These include firstly the belief that 
the self is illusory and that it may be fallacious to view the self as a 
unifying thread of mental events. Secondly, our self-awareness, which is 
driven by an apparent unity of consciousness, may need to be seen instead 
as merely a series of related events or a succession of mental states. 
Thirdly, despite being conscious of its unsound foundations, we appear 
impelled nonetheless to maintain an ongoing narrative called the self in our 
minds, a chronicle that we treat as a repository for past events and future 
plans and which helps orient ourselves in the world. Lastly, it would seem 
that our relationship with the external world has a lot of say in how this 
self-building project evolves. I will now, in the next four sections, analyse 
Borges’ work in terms of these concepts of selfhood and how he uses this 
knowledge to present his worldview to the reader. 
 
The self in Borges: The self is illusory 
In his introduction to the Labyrinths, Borges’ translator, James E Irby, 
notes that Borges once claimed that “the problematical nature of the world, 
of knowledge, of time, of the self” was both his essential theme and 
important literary device42 This concern with the uncertain nature of the 
self – which may trigger an enquiry also into the nature of time, the world 
and definitions of knowledge – is reflected in the opening words of one of 
Borges’ early essays, ‘Nothingness of Personality’. Under the heading 
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‘Intention’, Borges declares that he proposes “to prove that personality is a 
mirage maintained by conceit and custom, without metaphysical foundation 
or visceral reality. I want to apply to literature the consequences that issue 
from these premises…”43 W. H. Bossart, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy 
at University of California Davis, points out that Borges evinces this 
intention elsewhere too. In both the ‘Essay on Leon’ and the short story 
‘The Theologians’ (in which God is unable to tell Aurelian from John of 
Pannonia) Borges refers to what Bossart describes as “the metaphysical 
unreality of the individual self.”44 
In his parable ‘Everything and Nothing’ too Borges asserts that no 
one – this includes Shakespeare and even God, let alone mere mortals – 
escapes from the illusory nature of the self. This parable is about an actor 
who is so skilful that “others would not discover his condition as no one,” 
someone without substance. But when the act is finished hard reality 
returns and it reminds him yet again that he is no one. He is empty inside, 
“a dream dreamt by no one.”45 Hounded by this skirmish between shifting 
identities, the protagonist commences writing fables that articulate his 
imaginings. The thoughts of the characters in his plays reflect the conflict 
and confusion within the mind of the author. For instance, Iago (it is, as 
Borges reveals towards the end, William Shakespeare whom this parable is 
about) claims “I am not what I am” and Richard III affirms that he too 
performs, in a similar vein, the part of many. As he lies dying (towards the 
end of the parable), the Bard tells God that, “I who have been so many men 
in vain want to be one and myself”. To this, God responds, “Neither am I 
anyone; I have dreamt the world as you dreamt your work, my 
Shakespeare, and among the forms in my dream are you, who like myself 
are many and no one.”46 
By the time he wrote ‘Everything and Nothing’ Borges’ mind, 
according to Norman Thomas di Giovanni, was full of Hindu and Buddhist 
thought and he was ready to let his new philosophical ideas influence his 
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45 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 284. 
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writing.47 These ideas would include the Eastern mystical thought that the 
individual self is seen as illusory when viewed as separate from Brahman, 
which is the only reality. As di Giovanni explains, “Shankara [the Hindu 
philosopher and theologian from the eighth century CE] worked out two 
levels of truth – the ordinary level and the higher level of transcendent 
truth, in which it is held that the world is not real.”48 As we saw earlier, 
Buddhists too distinguish between ‘nominal existence’ attributed to selves 
which are merely combinations of elements and ‘actual existence’ which 
applies to an entity which can exists by itself. The influence of these 
thoughts is evinced in Borges’ ‘The Dialogues of Ascetic and King’, which 
is peppered with similar ideas from both East and West to highlight “a dark 
opposition of symbols… in which the ascetic may in some way equal or 
surpass the infinite king.”49 One version of these dialogues is that between 
Milinda the king and Nagasena, “the bearer of the torch of truth.”50 When 
the king asks Nagasena his name, the latter replies that “names are mere 
conventions that do not define permanent subjects” and possess only the 
‘nominal existence’ that philosophers talk about. Nagasena adds that just as 
“the King’s chariot is neither its wheels nor its body… so man is not 
matter, form, perception, ideas, instinct, or consciousness.”51 
While the dialogue between Milinda and the ascetic is about 
‘nominal existence’, Borges calls attention to the related Eastern mystical 
notion of ‘actual existence’ by noting (in ‘From Someone to Nobody’) that 
“Shankara teaches that all mankind, in a deep sleep, is the universe, is 
God...”52 as we are also part of Brahman, the ultimate reality. Norman 
Thomas di Giovanni adds that “the concept of self in [Borges’ poem] ‘The 
Watcher’ too approaches this view.”53 The Watcher ends with the following 
two lines: 
The door to suicide is open, but theologians assert that, in the subsequent 
Shadows of the other kingdom, there will I be, waiting for myself.54  
                                                
47  Norman Thomas di Giovanni, The Lesson of the Master: On Borges and His Work (London: 
Continuum, 2003[1988]), p. 85. 
48 di Giovanni, Lesson of the Master, p. 84. 
49 Borges, Total Library, p. 382. 
50 Borges, Total Library, p. 383. 
51 Borges, Total Library, p. 383. 
52 Borges, Total Library, p. 342. 
53 di Giovanni, Lesson of the Master, p. 84. 
54 Jorge Luis Borges, Selected Poems, ed. Alexander Coleman, trans. Willis Barnstone et al. (New York: 
Penguin Group, 1999), p. 325. 
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As di Giovanni tells us, here Borges seems to be offering two expositions 
of the self. One of these is the “I” with its earthly concerns and the other 
which is “on some disembodied, spiritual level.”55 But the bitter tone of 
‘The Watcher’ suggests too, di Giovanni feels, “Borges’s struggle to 
reconcile the drudgery of being Mr Borges… [experiencing the dichotomy 
between] the physical world with a loss of life and attainment of 
transcendental truth.”56 
Perhaps his awareness and belief that only a transcendent truth has 
reality whereas the everyday world is insubstantial gives Borges the 
courage to not be afraid of mortality and conversely not seek immortality at 
an individual level. Borges in his 1978 lecture on ‘Immortality’ wondered: 
We could say that immortality is necessary – not the personal, but this other 
immortality. For example, each time that someone loves an enemy, the 
immortality of Christ appears. In that moment, he is Christ. Each time we 
repeat a line by Dante or Shakespeare, we are, in some way, that instant 
when Dante or Shakespeare created that line. Immortality is in the memory 
of others and in the works we leave behind. What does it matter if that work 
is done?57 
 
The self as a succession of mental states 
Yet, we do seem impelled to somehow impute a sense of continuity to our 
notions of the self. But, if what we can experience are solely our 
perceptions (as Hume observed), does this self really exist or is it like a 
Heraclitean river of flux? Borges alludes to this conundrum when he writes 
that “I, as I write this, am only a certainty that seeks out the words that 
[will] compel your attention. That proposition and a few muscular 
sensations… constitute my current I.”58 This seems to resonate also with 
what Hume thought. J. M. Coetzee too refers to this resonance when 
observing that the “ideas on which [Borges’] ‘Pierre Menard’ [from ‘Pierre 
Menard, Author of the Quixote’] is built can be found in David Hume (the 
past, including the age of Cervantes, has no existence except as a 
succession of mental states).”59 
The Bundle Theory of identity we looked at earlier also offers views 
similar to that of Hume on perceptions. We saw how Buddhism views the 
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role of the self as a unifying thread of our mental properties as a fallacy. 
What we have instead is a series of moments, experiences and their 
memories all tied up together like a bundle. Jorge Luis Borges touches 
upon this idea when in ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ he states: 
The metaphysicians of Tlön [reject] the impossible addition of the present 
and of all past moments. Neither is it licit to use the plural ‘past moments’, 
since it supposes another impossible operation… One of the schools of Tlön 
goes so far as to negate time: it reasons that the present is indefinite, that the 
future has no reality other than as a present hope, that the past has no reality 
other than as a present memory.60 
In a note to the above passage in ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’, Borges notes 
that Bertrand Russell argued that “the planet has been created a few 
minutes ago, furnished with a humanity that ‘remembers’ an illusory 
past.”61 The Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa (who used more than 
seventy-five literary alter egos) too reflected this idea of the world being 
created anew every moment by saying: “Each moment I feel as if I’ve just 
been born/Into an endlessly new world.”62 
The nexus between time and the momentary of nature of the self is 
echoed also in the following lines from Borges’ poem ‘The Instant’:  
The present is singular. It is memory 
that sets up time. Both succession and error 
come with the routine of the clock. A year 
is no less vanity than is history.63 
 
The self as a necessary abstraction 
Why and how do we maintain this narrative of a self, which Jan Westerhoff 
compares to a “thread running through every single one of a string of 
pearls”?64  We seem compelled to sustain this illusion however make-
believe in nature it may be. Despite his “intention” (as noted earlier) to 
“prove that personality is a mirage,” Borges realises that such a “thread” is 
a necessity as otherwise a life without the notion of a self will lead to 
darkness. He writes, in ‘A New Refutation of Time’: 
And yet, and yet… Denying temporal succession, denying the self, denying 
the astronomical universe, are apparent desperations and secret consolations. 
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Our destiny… is not frightful by being unreal; it is frightful because it is 
irreversible and iron-clad. Time is the substance I am made of.65 
What Borges appears to imply here is because we need a self to provide a 
scaffolding for our memories and explain time to ourselves, in doing 
otherwise – namely, “denying the self” and “denying temporal succession” 
– we will risk madness. Borges thinks that Schopenhauer too affirmed this 
belief when he notes (In ‘Nothingness of Personality’) that “Schopenhauer 
[opines] that the self is a point whose immobility is useful for discerning, 
by contrast, the heavy-laden flight of time. This opinion translates the self 
into a… logical imperative…”66 
While I am prey to time’s flux, I need the self to provide that 
immobile point. Even so, I am aware that, while time consumes me, I am 
part also of a higher reality – what the Buddha referred to as ‘actual 
existence’ and Shankara looked upon as the higher level of truth. This truth 
is exquisitely expressed in Borges’ oft-quoted words: “Time is a river 
which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, 
but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. The 
world, unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges.”67 Bossart thinks 
that what Borges makes manifest here not only echoes the teachings of 
Spinoza (besides Eastern mystical thought) but also connects with the idea 
that there is no well-defined space between fiction and reality. There is too 
the “submersion of the individual in [time’s] whirlpool,” Bossart writes.68 
But (Bossart adds) time is also “an unstable material. And perhaps its 
source lies in me; perhaps from my shadow surge the days, fatal and 
illusory.”69 
 
Social interaction and the self-making process 
The American philosopher and psychologist, William James, examined the 
self in two ways. There is the ‘I’ which represents my awareness of the 
present moment. There is then the ‘me’ which looks at the bigger picture, 
as it were, of who I am, my history and my plans for the future.70 James 
looked upon these two aspects, as Aboulafia explains, as a “relationship 
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between ‘parts’ of the stream of consciousness.”71 Sociologist, George 
Herbert Mead, held the similar view that we experience a “running current 
of awareness” owing to this relationship between the ‘I’ and ‘me’. “The 
action with reference to the others calls responses in the individual… there 
is then another ‘me’ criticizing, approving, suggesting, and consciously 
planning…”72 
It would therefore appear that in the absence of a clearly 
identifiable organ called the self, we feel not only the need to create a 
fulcrum for our mental lives, (what Daniel Dennett calls our “center of 
narrative gravity”73) but tend also to populate that story with a multiplicity 
of characters. Borges notes in his essay ‘From Someone to Nobody’ that 
“to be something is inexorably not to be all the other things; the confused 
intuition of this truth has induced mankind to imagine that being nothing is 
more than being something and is, in some way, to be everything.”74 
Elsewhere too, Borges exhibits a penchant for using similar motifs of a 
person seeking more than one self. In his afterword to The Book of Sand 
collection he remarks that the short story, ‘The Other’, “once more takes up 
the old theme of the double,” and goes on to enumerate various terms used 
to denote the double, such as the wraith, fetch and doppelganger.75 Borges 
links our concerns about the existence of a self on the one hand with the 
need, on the other, to grapple with multiple selves when he writes in 
‘Borges and I’ that “I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if it is true that 
I am someone), but I recognise myself less in his books than in many 
others…”76 
These thoughts of Borges point to how these multiple selves are 
defined and shaped by both our values and aspirations and also by the 
external world. Stanford Professor of Philosophy, John Perry, uses the 
concept of the “motivating cognitive complex” to describe the interplay of 
our beliefs and desires and how we express them.77 If I intend to take a 
particular action A, as Perry explains, my beliefs and desires are firstly 
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what cause that action. Secondly, I also use the same beliefs and desires to 
rationalise that action. Our motivating cognitive complexes do not, 
however, form a coherent whole. Keeping this in mind, Perry looks upon 
‘Borges and I’ as “not simply a personification of an inaccurate public 
person, but one part of a not totally coherent self-concept.”78 Perry reasons 
that what the author has written, together with the opinions of his critics, 
has developed a persona that may not be wholly accurate. “And yet the 
author is constantly exposed to it, in the same ways that everyone else is, 
and cannot avoid it.”79 The story is then, in a sense, about two selves 
corresponding, Perry notes, “to two self-conceptions, two overlapping but 
significantly different complex of desires, ambitions and intentions… each 
taking control in turn…”80 
A reason for Borges’ apparent inability to maintain the ideal of a 
“totally coherent self-concept” may be that our self-machinery is influenced 
considerably by social interaction. Daniel Dennett equates the self to a 
“fiction created by… my brain acting in concert with my parents and 
friends.”81 As Robert Ezra Park observed, “we come into the world as 
individuals, achieve character and become persons.”82 William James too 
held that “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who 
recognise him.”83 The self thus becomes the sum total of several identities 
(son, friend, husband, father, boss, employee, etc.) besides being shaped by 
our values, aspirations, beliefs and desires. In his afterword to The Aleph 
collection, Borges writes, “A man sets out to draw the world. As the years 
go by, he peoples a space with images of provinces, kingdoms… and 
individuals. A short time before he dies, he discovers that the patient 
labyrinth of lines traces the lineaments of his own face…”84 (Andrew 
Hurley, one of Borges’ translators, notes that “this has often been cited as 
the perfect description of the phenomenon Borges/’Borges’”.)85 
How exactly does the external world influence this self-making 
process? In social interaction, as we anticipate benefits from the external 
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world, we try to imagine what others expect of us. We do this by taking on 
the perspective of Mead’s ‘generalized other’ which we came across 
earlier. This involves learning not only other members’ responses but also 
their actions and behaviour which can then be taken in. Erving Goffman 
uses the example of a raw recruit to the army to illustrate this. The recruit 
initially follows orders mainly to avoid punishment; but he later accepts 
army etiquette without any fears but in order to satisfy his own aspiration 
of becoming a well-accepted and respected member of the group.86 
Goffman labels as ‘front’, as we saw earlier, the equipment that a 
person employs as part of their social activity. This front consists 
furthermore of two parts: the ‘setting’ and the ‘scenic aspect’.87 While both 
these terms may refer to the props that surround a person, the former 
denotes immobile objects whereas the latter could move around with the 
performer. The setting may include, for instance, such things as the 
furniture in a room and its décor while scenic aspects may refer to say 
membership of exclusive clubs. By surrounding ourselves with these 
accoutrements, we subliminally influence the perception of others around 
us as part of ‘impression management’, Goffman tells us. Coetzee points 
out how Jorge Luis Borges may foster such impressions by, for instance, 
using his Englishness and part-Jewish ancestry as part of his “self-
fashioning.” Coetzee adds that Borges might have used his “rather 
hypothetical Sephardic” roots to explain his interests in the Kabbalah and 
also to project himself as an outsider to Western culture.88 Borges himself 
alludes also to our need, when we interact with others (or even other 
selves), to present what Goffman calls a ‘performance’ as part of the 
process of assuming a “social identity” we looked at earlier. He does this in 
‘Borges and I’ when he tells us that “the one called Borges” shares his 
liking for hourglasses and maps “in a vain way that turns them into the 
attributes of an actor,” as translated from the Spanish by James E. Irby.89 
This phrase indicates an even closer nexus with one playing a role when in 
di Giovanni’s translation it reads as “in a showy way that turns them into 
stagy mannerisms.”90 
                                                
86 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, p. 31. 
87 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, pp. 32-33. 
88 Coetzee, Stranger Shores, p. 167. 
89 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 282. 
90 di Giovanni, Lesson of the Master, p. 77. 
Borges and Nothingness 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 122 
While Borges may divulge – in the course of this “self-fashioning” 
– a few personal features selectively as part of his role-playing, he – like 
any other actor – may also choose to deliberately suppress exposing other 
information of a private kind. James Woodall, in his biography of Borges, 
cites the Borges’ Dreamtigers collection as a typical example of “Borges 
both concealing and revealing himself.”91 Borges describing Homer going 
blind in ‘The Maker’ (El Hacedor) illustrates this. Borges says of Homer: 
“Little by little, the beautiful universe left him behind: … the night was 
emptied of stars…”92 While this description is that of Homer’s blindness, 
“the mask here,” as Woodall sees it, “is a thin one. We know this is Borges 
talking.”93 
Be that as it may, there could still be moments when an actor’s 
mask drops off completely and may reveal another person or self 
underneath. Goffman calls such events – where an actor fails occasionally 
to sustain a persona – as “definitional disruptions.”94 This could happen 
despite the actor having until then been quite adept at juggling his multiple 
personae. (In ‘Borges and I’, for instance, “the private and public men are,” 
di Giovanni observes, “on reasonable terms.”95 In a similar vein, the two 
men in Borges’ ‘The Other’ share an inability to whistle. Consequently, 
“what the man was whistling – or trying to whistle” triggers a shock of 
recognition in the narrator.96) Even a little too much congruence between 
identities can pose problems at times. 
The narrator in ‘The Other’ acknowledges later with a hint of 
resignation or futility: “We were too alike… and that makes conversation 
hard…no point in giving advice…”97 Erving Goffman refers to such pitfalls 
when, as noted earlier, he views the self-making process as 
“cumbersome”98 and looks upon the actor as being “engaged in a difficult, 
treacherous task.”99 These difficulties are caused by our being unable to 
maintain unflagging correspondence between the image we wish to project 
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and what we may actually achieve – or, a need to observe separation 
between – in Goffman’s dramaturgical lingo – the front and backstage. This 
failure results in a disparity, as Goffman puts it, between “the expression 
that [an actor] gives, and the expression he gives off.”100 He defines the 
former as communication in the normal sense while ‘gives off’ refers to 
“the non-verbal, presumably unintentional kind…”101 With his analysis of 
these nuances and the perils they pose, Goffman reminds us – as Michael 
Dirda observes – that “urban living transforms all of us not just into actors 
but often into broken-hearted clowns.”102 In the end, the only recourse an 
actor may have for avoiding such “definitional disruptions” is to employ 
what Goffman calls “preventive practices” by using fictive tools to 
compensate for these “discrediting occurrences” 103  or lack of 
verisimilitude. Borges appears to resort to such action when, in a number of 
his stories, he incorporates real persons – his friend and collaborator Bioy 
Caesars, for example, in ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ – or actual historical 
events within the narrative in order to blur distinctions between fact and 
fiction. 
Lastly, what significantly hampers these ‘performances’ is that 
getting inside someone else’s mind is no easy task – even if it is just 
another facet of one’s own identity in the context of multiple selves. A 
problem that an actor encounters here is, as Goffman highlights, that of 
“ambivalence about oneself and one’s audience.”104 ‘Averroës’s Search’ by 
Borges is, for instance, about the difficulty Averroës faces in trying to 
translate Aristotle’s works without understanding what a play was as the 
theatre had never been part of his cultural background. “The primary 
message of [this story] is that,” Bossart points out, “there is no context 
neutral standpoint from which one can consider the data of experience 
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The gap between language and reality 
While commenting on one of Francisco de Quevedo’s sonnets, Borges remarks, “I 
shall not say that it is a transcription of reality, for reality is not verbal…”106 
Borges reiterates this idea of language being an inadequate proxy for reality when 
in ‘The Library of Babel’ he examines the efficacy of the library being a metaphor 
for the universe. The narrator of this story recalls: 
At that time it was… hoped that a clarification of humanity’s basic mysteries… might 
be found… if the language of philosophers is not sufficient, the multiform Library will 
have produced the unprecedented language required... [But] for four centuries now 
men have exhausted the hexagons… Obviously, no one expects to discover 
anything.107 
While the library is expected to hold all knowledge, Bossart notes, “yet its 
incessant light is insufficient.” Bossart adduces a number of reasons for this. The 
search for the Book is unending, with clues that remain elusive. It is not possible 
moreover to clearly deduce a book’s content from its title. Lastly – perhaps more 
worryingly – “the order of the library is born of chance, and [so] books may [even] 
be a source of distortion.”108 
Robert Scholes, Emeritus Professor in English and Comparative 
Literature at Brown University, thinks that a recognition of the “opposition 
between language and reality, the unbridgeable gap between them, is fundamental 
to the Borgesian vision,” and is “a persistent theme in [Borges’] critical work.”109 
This awareness gives rise in fact, Coetzee feels, to a “sense of dread [which] is 
metaphysical… [and is infused with the] collapse of all structures of meaning, 
including language itself… [and the fact that the] very self that sparks has no real 
existence.”110 In other words, what exacerbates the task of trying to define a self to 
ourselves – and our place in the world – is this: In order to deal with an illusory 
self we resort to language, which we hope will garner meaning. But then we realise 
we have to contend also with this unbridgeable gap between language and reality. 
Borges tells us that Pierre Menard “did not want to compose another 
Quixote – which is easy – but the Quixote itself.” He avows in this quest “to go on 
being Pierre Menard and reach the Quixote through the experiences of Pierre 
Menard.”111 He later confesses the difficulty associated with “the mysterious duty 
of reconstructing literally [Cervantes’] spontaneous work.” Menard adds that his 
task is made impossible because “it is not in vain that three hundred years have 
gone by, filled with exceedingly complex events. Among them, to mention only 
                                                
106 In Robert Scholes, ‘The Reality of Borges’, The Iowa Review, vol. 8, no. 3 (1977), pp. 12-25.  
107 Borges, Labyrinths, pp. 82-83. 
108 Bossart, Borges and Philosophy, p. 114. 
109 Scholes, ‘Reality of Borges’. 
110 Coetzee, Stranger Shores, p. 173. 
111 Borges, Labyrinths, pp. 65-66. 
Borges and Nothingness 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 125 
one, is the Quixote itself.”112 We saw earlier how Averroës is caught within the 
clutches of culture. Here, Pierre Menard is unable to transcend the tentacles of 
time. The passage of time would inevitably prevent Menard from composing, as he 
wishes to, “the Quixote itself” because Menard, like every one of us, is part of a 
distinct literary tradition (as evinced by his literary achievements), as Bossart 
points out.113 Menard “is as tied to his time as [for example] Flaubert,” as Scholes 
observes, and cannot “avoid the curse of temporality.”114 As Menard seems to 
realise, the passage of time and events of history, among other things, change 
language and transform its meaning. Hence, “in order to interpret [language],” 
Scholes argues, “we must locate it in a frame of reference which is ineluctably 
temporal and cultural.”115 Keeping in mind these limitations of language, Borges 
believed – according to his biographer Edwin Williamson – that “fiction did not… 
hold up a mirror to reality.” The role of fiction instead was “to engender “poetic 
faith” in the reader.116 Borges reiterates this notion when in ‘The Avatars of the 
Tortoise’ he writes, “it is venturesome to think that a coordination of words 
(philosophies are nothing more than that) can resemble the universe very much.”117 
Menard’s attempt to reconstruct Cervantes’s time and space is therefore 
not only futile but is also a case of “authorial hubris,” in Woodall’s view. Woodall 
considers the story of Pierre Menard as Borges’ “brilliant fictional statement about 
the inefficacy of the written word… and the stark dubiety of the writer’s role.”118 
‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ too, Woodall points out, speaks of the self-doubt that 
assails the mind of a writer who has to rely on “fiction, untruth, a strange space 
where… the constructs of empirical reality are made ghostly…”119 Towards the 
end of this story, Borges writes about the falsehoods and uncertainties that cloud 
one’s memory of Tlön. “A fictitious past occupies in our memories in place of 
another, a past of which we know nothing with certainty – not even that it is 
false.”120 Woodall signals the foreboding nature of the story of Tlön when he 
opines that in this tale Borges was offering moreover “a metaphor for global 
catastrophe.” 121 (In fact, two months after ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ was 
published in 1940, Paris fell. Borges wrote in Sur that throughout 1940 “each 
morning, reality resembles more and more a nightmare.”)122 
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Conclusion 
In ‘Partial Magic in Quixote’, Borges talks about how Cervantes “takes 
pleasure in confusing the objective and the subjective”.123 For example, Don 
Quixote’s library includes Cervantes’s Galatea and it appears Quixote’s barber 
is a friend of the author of this book and, more interestingly, the barber does 
not admire Cervantes very much! Thus, “[t]he barber, a dream or the form of a 
dream of Cervantes, passes judgment on Cervantes.”124 In the same essay, 
Borges cites also an analogous inversion from Hamlet where Shakespeare 
includes another stage (within where the main story unfolds) where a tragedy 
almost similar to that of Hamlet is being enacted. Borges is concerned that 
“these inversions suggest that if the characters of a fictional work can be 
readers or spectators, we, its readers or spectators, can be fictitious.”125 
But then Borges was himself a great exponent of this art of melding 
layers of fiction and reality and he even uses the ambiguity that attends such a 
device as the central theme of ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’, one of his many 
fantastic stories. This perhaps harks back yet again to his recognition of the 
chimerical nature of the self – an awareness that I have endeavoured to reveal 
in this article – from which spring a writer’s imaginings. Borges reflects upon 
such limitations of the self – and how we all (including writers and 
philosophers) strive to orient ourselves using such an imperfect tool – when he 
writes that “the metaphysicians of Tlön do no seek for the truth or even for 
verisimilitude, but rather for the astounding.”126  The Tlön metaphysicians 
realise that exactitude with portraying reality is not within our reach thanks to 
our patchy understanding of the self and the inadequacies of language. It is 
therefore not surprising that they consider “metaphysics [as] a branch of 
fantastic literature.”127 Borges on his part displays here a perfect combination 
of deep insight and literary brilliance – an example perhaps of “the astounding” 
that the Tlön metaphysicians sought – and which, Andre Maurois thought, 
“well defines the greatness and the art of Borges.”128 
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